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Abstract
Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between risk and incen-
tives, yet recent empirical evidence has not consistently found such a rela-
tionship. In fact, some researchers have found a positive relationship. By
introducing competition for heterogeneous managers, who differ in their de-
grees of risk aversion, into a standard agency model, this paper demonstrates
that a negative or positive relationship is theoretically possible. Which arises
depends on the relative risk aversion parameters of the managers and the
absolute and relative riskiness of the environments.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, a number of authors have sought to empirically test
agency theory as developed in Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart
(1983). However, as these formulations of the agency problem were very
general not many results were forthcoming. As a result, empirical work has
often been based on a simple version of the agency problem which can be
found in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). In this version, agents have expo-
nential utility and errors are normally distributed. The main prediction of
this simple model is that firms that operate in more risky environments offer
their managers compensation schemes in which incentives are less intense.
The empirical work that tests this prediction is summarised in Pren-
dergast (1999) and (2002a). His general conclusion is that “the evidence
is hardly overwhelming” for a negative relationship between risk and in-
centives. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) found a significant
negative relationship, Garen (1994) found a negative relationship, however,
it was statistically insignificant, and Core and Guay (1999) found a statis-
tically significant positive relationship between risk and incentives.
In a recent paper, Prendergast (2000) outlines a number of reasons why
one might expect to observe a positive relationship between risk and incen-
tives. These reasons are presented in greater detail in Prendergast (2002a)
and (2002b). In both of these papers the agent is assumed to be risk neutral
so risk sharing plays no role in the design of the optimal payment scheme.
In the first paper, monitoring is a substitute for incentive compensation, but
is of little value the more uncertain the environment and so is not used in
this case. As a result, risk and incentives are positively related. In the sec-
ond paper, performance evaluations are used to assign workers to the task
they are most suited too and to induce effort by workers. These evaluations
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can be distorted to favour particular workers and cause poor assignment of
workers. In an uncertain environment, these evaluations are of little use in
efficiently sorting workers and so are used to provide incentives for effort,
that is, a positive relationship between the riskiness of the environment and
incentives arises naturally.
This paper provides another reason why a positive relationship between
risk and incentives might be observed, but unlike Prendergast (2002a, 2002b),
it preserves the risk sharing role of the payment scheme. The crucial fac-
tors are the existence of managers with different degrees of risk aversion
and competition between firms for these managers. It is less costly for all
firms to induce a given action from a less risk averse manager than a more
risk averse manager because less has to be paid to compensate the less risk
averse manager for the risk he/she bears. Therefore, all firms would like
to hire less risk averse managers and compete amongst themselves for their
services. Under conditions given in this paper, firms that operate in a more
risky environment are prepared to pay more for the services of the less risk
averse managers than firms operating in the less risky environment, there-
fore, competition ensures these less risk averse managers are hired by the
riskier firms. Although, ceteris paribus, the more risky the firm the less in-
tense are the incentives, it is also true that the less risk averse the manager
the more intense are the incentives. If this latter effect dominates the first,
then firms in the riskier environment will be observed to offer compensation
scheme which involve more intense incentives than those offered by firms in
the less risky environment. As a result, an observed positive relationship
between risk and incentives is not inconsistent with agency theory.
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2. Incentives and Risk
A simple model is used to illustrate the trade-off between incentives and
risk. The model had its genesis in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), and
can be found in Varian (1992), Gibbons (1998), and Prendergast (1999). A
risk averse manager takes unobservable action e which generates firm gross
profit Y = e + ², where ² ∼ N(0, σ2). The monetary cost of this action
to the manager is C(e) = ce
2
2 and the manager’s utility function is given
by U(w, e) = −expr[w−C(e)], where w is the compensation received by the
manager and r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. The
manager is assumed to have an outside option represented by a certain
compensation w¯ so reservation utility is U(w¯). Manager compensation is
restricted to linear payment schemes of the form w = α + βY. The risk
neutral firm maximises expected net profit, y = e − E[w] = (1 − β)e − α,
subject to the usual participation and incentive compatibility constraints,
by choosing α and β.
The intensity of the incentives provided by the compensation scheme are
reflected in β. Let the solution to the firm’s problem be denoted by an ∗,
then it is easy to show that
β∗ =
1
1 + rcσ2
. (1)
For later reference it is convenient to give the solutions to the firm’s
problem for α, e, and y
e∗ =
β∗
c
=
1
c(1 + rcσ2)
α∗ = (rσ2 − 1
c
) · ( 1
2(1 + rcσ2)2
)
+ w¯. (2)
y∗ = (1− β∗)e∗ − α∗ = 1
2c(1 + rcσ2)
− w¯ (3)
It should be noted that the participation constraint binds at this solution so
the optimal compensation scheme, (α∗, β∗), yields the manager reservation
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utility, U(w¯).
3. Heterogeneous Firms and Managers
It is assumed that managers are one of two types, type n or type a. Type n
managers are assumed to be less risk averse than type a managers, that is,
rn < ra. In addition, it is assumed that there are two types of firms, type h
and type l. Type l firms are assumed to operate in a less risky environment
than type h firms, that is, σ2l < σ
2
h. Let α
i∗
j , β
i∗
j , e
i∗
j , y
i∗
j ; i = n, a; j =
h, l; be the solution to the problem of a firm of type j employing a manager
of type i.
Proposition 1: βi∗l > β
i∗
h i = n, a.
This follows by direct substitution into (1). Proposition 1 states that
firms that operate in less risky environments optimally choose payment
schemes with more intense incentives. This result is the negative relation-
ship between risk and incentives that has been the cornerstone of agency
theory. Before outlining a reason why a positive relationship may be found,
a number of useful results are given.
Lemma 1: βn∗j > β
a∗
j j = h, l.
This follows by direct substitution into (1). As expected, firms of either
type provide more intense incentives to managers that are less risk averse
than managers that are more risk averse.
Lemma 2: yn∗j > y
a∗
j j = h, l.
This follows by direct substitution into (3). As expected, firms of either
type have greater expected net profit if they employ a manager, who is less
risk averse, than if they employ a manager, who is more risk averse.
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It turns out that the sensitivity of Lemma 2 to firm type is important in
the analysis of the next section. Let δj = yn∗j − ya∗j measure this sensitivity,
it is the difference in net profit that a firm achieves by hiring the less risk
averse manager rather than the more risk averse manager. Substitution
yields
δj =
(ra − rn)σ2j
2(1 + craσ2j )(1 + crnσ
2
j )
(4)
Differentiation of δj with respect to σ2j yields a unique positive stationary
point at σ2c =
1
c
√
rarn
. Further differentiation reveals that this stationary
point is a maximum.
Lemma 3: If σ2h > σ
2
l > σ
2
c , then δl > δh. On the other hand, if σ
2
l < σ
2
h <
σ2c , then δl < δh. If σ
2
h > σ
2
c > σ
2
l , then any ranking of δh and δl is possible.
This follows from δc being a unique maximum. The content of Lemma
3 is that if the riskiness of the environment that both firms face is large,
relative to δc, then hiring the less risk averse manager is more valuable
to the firm in the less risky environment than the firm in the more risky
environment. On the other hand, if the riskiness of the environment that
both firms face is small, relative to δc, then hiring the less risk averse manager
is more valuable to the firm in the more risky environment than the firm in
the less risky environment. The intuition is clear. Where the riskiness of the
environment is large, incentives are not intense, especially for the relatively
more risky environment, therefore, the additional risk associated with the
more risky environment is not very costly to the firm and so it does not
value the less risk averse manager very highly. On the other hand, where the
riskiness of the environment is small, incentives are intense, therefore, even
though incentives are less intense in the relatively more risky environment,
the additional risk associated with the more risky environment is very costly
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to the firm and so it values the less risk averse manager very highly.
4. Competition for Managers
A fact seemed to be ignored by a large part of the agency literature is that
firms choose their managers. If some managers are less risk averse than
others and it is the more risky firms that hire these managers, then it is
possible that these risky firms will have compensation packages with more
intense incentives than less risky firms. This possibility is now explored.
It is assumed that there are N managers of type n, A managers of type
a, H firms of type h, and L firms of type l. In addition, it is assumed that the
number of firms is no greater than the number of potential managers, that is,
H+L ≤ A+N. This ensures all firms get a manager. Finally, it is assumed
that the number of type n managers is less than the total number of firms,
that is, N < H + L. These assumptions create an excess demand for type
n managers if the four compensation schemes, (αi∗j , β
i∗
j ), i = n, a; j = h, l
are offered. This excess demand for type n managers arises because, by
Lemma 2, all firms have higher profits if they employ an n type manager and
N < H+L. Competition for type n managers results in the fixed component
of the compensation scheme being bid up until the excess demand for type
n managers is eliminated. If it is assumed that δh > δl, competition for
the n type managers results in the firms in the more risky environment
being able to offer n type managers a more attractive compensation scheme
and so hiring the less risk averse managers in equilibrium. As a result, the
firms in the more risky environment might be observed to offer more intense
incentives than firms in the less risky environment.
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Proposition 2: It is assumed that all firms observe H and N , σ2h and σ
2
l ,
ra and rn, and that there is competitive bidding for managers, and that
δh > δl.
(i) If H ≤ N, then the equilibrium compensation scheme and allocation
of managers to firms is (a) all of the h type firms employ a type n manager
with compensation scheme (αn∗h + δl, β
n∗
h ), (b) N − H of the l type firms
employ a type n manager with compensation scheme (αn∗l +δl, β
n∗
l ), and (c)
L−(N−H) of the l type firms employ a type a manager with compensation
scheme (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ).
(ii) If H > N, then the equilibrium compensation scheme and allocation
of managers to firms is (a) N of the type h firms employ a type n manager
with compensation scheme (αn∗h + δh, β
n∗
h ), (b) H − N of the h type firms
employ a type a manager with compensation scheme (αa∗h , β
a∗
h ), and (c) all
of the type l firms employ a type a manager with compensation scheme
(αa∗l , β
a∗
l ).
Proof: Appendix
The excess demand for the more valuable type n manager, which exists
if type n managers are offered a compensation scheme which gives then their
reservation utility, is eliminated through the firms that employ the less risk
averse managers paying them a greater fixed payment. Where H ≤ N, the
h type firms and the l type firms that employ type n managers compete
with l type firms for their services, therefore, they need only increase the
fixed payment by enough to induce them from l type firms, δl. However,
where H > N, the h type firms that employ type n managers compete with
other h type firms for their services, therefore, competition between h firms
increases the fixed payment by how much more n type managers are worth
than a type managers, δh.
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To date it has been implicitly assumed that manager type is observable
by firms. However, even if manager type was not observable, Proposition
2 would apply. The proof in the appendix demonstrates that the compen-
sation schemes in Proposition 2 induce self-selection, with type i managers
optimally choosing the compensation scheme designed for them. For ex-
ample, if the three compensation schemes in part (i) of Proposition 2 were
offered, type n managers would optimally choose scheme (αn∗h + δl, β
n∗
h ) or
(αn∗l + δl, β
n∗
l ) and obtain expected utility of U(w¯ + δl) while type a man-
agers would optimally choose scheme (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) and obtain expected utility
of U(w¯).
It should also be noted that although Proposition 2 is derived for the case
of two types of managers and two types of firms its general thrust carries
naturally over to the case of a finite number of types of managers and firms.
To see this, assume that there are m managers, each of a different type,
ri, i = 1, ...,m, and f firms, each of a different type, σ2j , j = 1, ..., f .
Order the managers so that r1 < r2 < .... < rm and order the firms so that
σ21 > σ
2
2 > .... > σ
2
f . Assume m = f , that is, the number of managers is the
same as the number of firms. Define δi,i+xj = y
i
j − yi+xj , x = 1, ...,m− 1 as
the difference in net profit that a firm of type j achieves by hiring a manager
of type i rather than a manager of type i+ x. Assume σ2j < σ
2
c .
Proposition 2a: It is assumed that all firms observe m = f , σ2j ∀ j,
ri ∀ i, and that there is competitive bidding for managers, and that δi,i+xj >
δi,i+xj+1 ∀ i, j. In equilibrium, the type j firm employs a type i manager,
where i = j, with compensation scheme (αi∗j + δ
i,i+1
j , β
i∗
j ).
Proof: Identical in structure to that used to prove Proposition 2.
Given the assumptions, the firm in the riskiest environment employs the
least risk averse manager because this manager is worth more to this firm
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than any other firm. The firm in the second riskiest environment employs
the second least risk averse manager, and so on.
5. A Positive Relationship Between Risk and
Incentives
Having established that a competitive equilibrium exists in which h type
firms employ some or all of the n type managers and some l type firms
always employ a type managers, the following proposition establishes that
incentives may be more intense in the high risk environment.
Proposition 3: Assuming competitive bidding for managers and δh > δl.
βn∗h > β
a∗
l if
ra
rn >
σ2h
σ2l
.
This follows by direct substitution into (1). There are two effects operat-
ing on the relationship between the intensity of incentives and the riskiness
of the environment. The first is the usual effect given in Proposition 1 that
incentives are less intense in the more risky environment, given manager
type. The second is the manager allocation effect, where given δh > δl, less
risk averse managers are employed by the more risky firms. As less risk
averse managers are given more intense incentives this second effect results
in more intense incentives in the more risky environment. The condition
under which the second effect dominates the first is given in Proposition 3.
The manager allocation effect is large the more different are the managers,
that is, the greater is r
a
rn , on the other hand, the effect given in Proposition
1 is small the less different are the firms, that is, the smaller is σ
2
h
σ2l
.
Even if the conditions in Proposition 3 are satisfied not all high risk
firms offer more intense incentives to their managers than low risk firms. If
H ≤ N, N − H type l firms employ type n managers. By Proposition 1,
these low risk firms offer more intense incentives to their n type managers
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than the high risk firms. Similarly, if H > N, H − N type h firms employ
type a managers. Once again, by Proposition 1, these high risk firms of-
fer less intense incentives to their a type managers than the low risk firms.
This establishes that there are conditions under which high risk firms of-
fer more intense incentives to their managers than some low risk firms, but
less intense incentives than to the other low risk firms. Although this is a
very stylized model the empirical implications are clear. If managers have
different degrees of risk aversion and manager allocation between firms is
endogenous, then a priori one should not expect a positive or negative rela-
tionship between the riskiness of the environment and incentive intensity to
show up in the data. This might help explain why no clear cut relationship
has in fact been found.
6. Conclusion
By introducing managers with different degrees of risk aversion and com-
petitive bidding for these managers into a very standard agency model, this
paper has demonstrated that a positive relationship between risk and in-
centives is theoretically possible. Whether or not this positive relationship
arises depends on the parameters of the model, in particular, on the relative
sizes of the risk aversion parameters of the managers and the relative and
absolute sizes of the riskiness of the environment the firms face. The empir-
ical implication of this work and the work of Prendergast (2000a,b) is that
an observed positive or negative relationship between risk and incentives is
not a test of agency theory unless other variables that affect this relationship
are controlled for.
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
H ≤ N : Where H ≤ N, the h type firms and the l type firms compete
with l type firms for n type managers, therefore, competition increases the
fixed payment by δl. For the allocation of managers in the proposition to be
an equilibrium, n type managers must prefer compensation schemes (αn∗h +
δl, β
n∗
h ) and (α
n∗
l + δl, β
n∗
l ) to (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ) and a type managers must prefer
compensation scheme (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to (α
n∗
h + δl, β
n∗
h ) and (α
n∗
l + δl, β
n∗
l ).
(a) n type managers prefer (αn∗l + δl, β
n∗
l ) to (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ). The expected
utility of scheme (αn∗l + δl, β
n∗
l ) to an n type manager is U(w¯ + δl). The
expected utility of scheme (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to an n type manager is U(w¯ + ∆),
where ∆ > 0 because risk is not as costly to an n type manager as an a
type manager. Now δl can be decomposed into two parts, (1) the extra
profit obtained by hiring a risk neutral rather than a risk averse manager
because less of a risk premium needs to be paid, keeping the compensation
scheme unchanged at (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ), this is exactly ∆; and (2) the extra profit
obtained by hiring a risk neutral rather than a risk averse manager because
the components of the optimal compensation scheme change from (αa∗l , β
a∗
l )
to (αn∗l , β
n∗
l ). Because of (2), U(w¯ + δl) > U(w¯ +∆) and n type managers
prefer (αn∗l + δl, β
n∗
l ) to (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ).
(b) n type managers prefer (αn∗h +δl, β
n∗
h ) to (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ). n type managers
are indifferent between (αn∗h + δl, β
n∗
h ) and (α
n∗
l + δl, β
n∗
l ), both yielding
U(w¯ + δl). It was shown in (a) that U(w¯ + δl) > U(w¯ + ∆), so n type
managers prefer (αn∗h + δl, β
n∗
h ) to (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ).
(c) a type managers prefer (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to (α
n∗
l + δl, β
n∗
l ). Let Φ be the
additional fixed payment that would make a type a manager indifferent
between the two compensation schemes, (αn∗l +Φ, β
n∗
l ) and (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ). Both
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of these compensation schemes give expected utility of U(w¯) to a type a
manager. Suppose Φ < δl. Regardless of what type of manager is hired, the
expected profit of a type l firm is greater with the compensation scheme
(αn∗l +Φ, β
n∗
l ) than (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ) by the supposition. Given both compensation
schemes yield a type a manager the same expected utility, U(w¯), there is
a contradiction because by definition, (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) maximizes the expected
profit of a type l firm hiring a type a manager. Therefore, the supposition is
incorrect and Φ ≥ δl. Now the expected utility of scheme (αa∗l , βa∗l ) to an a
type manager is U(w¯). By the definition of Φ and Φ ≥ δl, U(w¯) = U(w¯+Φ) ≥
U(w¯ + δl) so a type managers weakly prefer (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to (α
n∗
l + δl, β
n∗
l ).
(d) a type managers prefer (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to (α
n∗
h + δl, β
n∗
h ). An identical
proof to (c) applies. Therefore, a type managers weakly prefer (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to
(αn∗h + δl, β
n∗
h ). (Q.E.D.)
H > N : Where H > N, the h type firms compete amongst themselves
for n type managers, therefore, competition increases the fixed payment by
δh. For the allocation of managers in the proposition to be an equilibrium, n
type managers must prefer compensation scheme (αn∗h + δh, β
n∗
h ) to schemes
(αa∗h , β
a∗
h ) and (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ) and a type managers must prefer compensation
schemes (αa∗h , β
a∗
h ) and (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ) to (α
n∗
h + δh, β
n∗
h ).
(e) n type managers prefer compensation scheme (αn∗h +δh, β
n∗
h ) to (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ).
Using (b) above and the fact that δh > δl gives the result.
(f) n type managers prefer compensation scheme (αn∗h +δh, β
n∗
h ) to (α
a∗
h , β
a∗
h ).
Noting that (αa∗h , β
a∗
h ) and (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ) yield the same expected utility together
with (e) above gives the result.
(g) a type managers prefer compensation scheme (αa∗h , β
a∗
h ) to (α
n∗
h +
12
δh, β
n∗
h ). An identical proof to (c) above applies.
(h) a type managers prefer compensation scheme (αa∗l , β
a∗
l ) to (α
n∗
h +
δh, β
n∗
h ). Noting that (α
a∗
l , β
a∗
l ) and (α
a∗
h , β
a∗
h ) yield the same expected utility
together with (g) gives the result. (Q.E.D.)
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